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 Abstract. In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperative behavior in a 
dynamic model of population interaction. The model has finitely many individuals 
located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local) 
interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction with the whole 
population. The dynamics is driven by imitative behavior. I show that for a large class of 
parameters cooperation will emerge if the population is large; if the population is small, 
defection will prevail in the long run. The result contrasts with conventional wisdom 
which says that the larger the population, the less likely cooperation will be. 
 
 
Key Words: Cooperation, Prisoner's Dilemma, Evolutionary Game Theory, Local Interaction 
 
JEL-codes: C72, D62 
 
 
 
Correspondence Address: 
Maarten Janssen 
Department of Economics/Micro 
Erasmus University 
P.O. Box 1738 
3000 DR  ROTTERDAM 
The Netherlands 
 
 
I thank Harry Garretsen, Sanjeev Goyal, Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked, seminar participants 
at the University of Groningen and participants of the Summer workshop on Dynamic Games at 
the University of Warwick for helpful comments. 
 
  
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Different approaches exist to explaining cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
With perfectly rational agents cooperation is an equilibrium outcome if the chance that the game 
is repeated another time is sufficiently large. With boundedly rational agents in evolutionary 
game theory, cooperation may emerge if the interaction between agents is non-uniform, i.e., the 
chance that cooperative types meet each other is higher than the chance that they meet defective 
types. One such a case is when interaction is between siblings (see, e.g., Bergstrom and Stark, 
1993). Another is when interaction is only between neighbors as in Eshel, Shaked and 
Samuelson (1998). It is commonly thought in both approaches that due to increasing anonymity 
cooperation is less likely to be observed in large populations than in smaller ones. In this paper I 
present a dynamic model that tell us that this is not necessarily so. 
 
I consider the interaction between members of two different populations. The two populations 
have lived in isolation of each other and for reasons not analysed here, one population has 
evolved in the past towards cooperative behavior and the other towards defective behavior. Now 
that I see an increase in the interaction between different societies, I want to study the question 
whether the interaction between members of the two populations results in one type of behavior 
driving out the other or in the two types of behavior coexisting next to each other. This type of 
analysis has been done for coordination games in Goyal and Janssen (1997). 
 
In the model each individual agent interacts with anyone in the population, but more so with 
their neighbors. Given some population configuration each individual receives a certain pay-off. 
The pay-off is a weighted average of the pay-offs under strict uniform and local interaction. The 
implications of two types of imitation dynamics are examined. Under Imitating the Best Agent 
(IBA), each agent observes the pay-off of each individual in the neighborhood and individuals 
imitate the agent who has received the highest pay-off in the previous period. Under imitating 
the best behavior (cooperation or defection), each agent only observes the average pay-off of 
cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood and they imitate the action that has yielded the 
highest average pay-off in the neighborhood (IBB). I will look at the development of the number 
of cooperative agents over time by investigating the behavior of the boundary between the two 
populations. 
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Roughly speaking, our main result is that for a wide range of parameter values and for any of the 
above mentioned dynamic processes there exists a threshold value (depending on the parameter 
values) of the population size: if the population size is larger than this threshold value 
cooperation will emerge, if on the other hand the population size is smaller than the threshold 
value cooperation will vanish. (For some other parameter values coexistence of the behaviors of 
the two populations is possible). The intuition for the main result can be grasped by comparing 
the pay-off of a cooperative type who is surrounded by other cooperative agents and the pay-off 
of a defective type who is surrounded by other defective agents. What matters in both classes of 
dynamic processes is not the absolute value of the pay-off, but the pay-off of a certain type 
relative to the pay-offs of others (cf., Vega-Redondo, 1997). The total pay-off difference 
between the cooperative and the defective type under consideration can be decomposed in a 
pay-off difference due to local interaction and a pay-off difference due to uniform interaction. 
The pay-off difference due to local interaction is independent of the size of the population and 
positive, i.e., the cooperative type receives a larger pay-off out of local interaction than the 
defective type. The pay-off difference due to uniform interaction itself can be decomposed into 
two parts. A first part is due to the fact that in a match with a given agent of the population, the 
defective type always receives a higher pay-off than the cooperative type. This part is also 
independent of the size of the population. A second part is due to the fact that under uniform 
interaction, a cooperative type meets relatively more defective agents than the defective agents 
themselves do. This is because a given agent will be matched with one of the other agents in the 
population.1 This second part also favors the defective agents, but this part of the uniform 
interaction effect vanishes as the population size becomes large. Given the observations above it 
is then relatively easy to see that the uniform interaction effect may dominate the local 
interaction effect for small populations, whereas the reverse may hold true for large populations. 
 
From the above it becomes clear that what is important for the result is (i) the presence of some 
neighborhood effect and (ii) some form of non-best reply dynamics. If interactions were uniform 
in the population, each agent will roughly meet the same agents as the others and in such a 
world, defection always yields a higher pay-off (as it is the dominant strategy). Also, over time 
best reply dynamics will result in defection as for any given behavior of a set of opponents, 
                     
 
    1 The fact that under uniform interaction you do not play a game with yourself is also used in a different context 
by Huck and Oechsler (1995). 
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defect is always the best reply. On the other hand, for the general idea of the results to hold, it is 
not so important whether pay-off comparisons are made locally or globally. In this paper I 
mainly focus on imitative behavior in which the pay-off comparisons are within the 
neighborhood. 
 
There is a large and rapidly growing literature in evolutionary game theory explaining the 
emergence of cooperative behavior in populations. I provide a sketchy overview of some of the 
main results. Two branches can be distinguished: a large part of the literature considers the 
evolution of behavior in a repeated version of the prisoner's dilemma; a smaller part considers 
the one shot game. The literature on the repeated PD game started with investigations by 
Axelrod (1984) and Maynard Smith (1982). More recently, May and Nowak (1992, 1993) study 
how cooperation may emerge when agents interact in two-dimensional spatial structures. They 
use computer simulations showing that depending on the interaction structure complex patterns 
of cooperative and defective behavior may persist. Ashlock, Stanley and Tesfatsion (1994) 
allow players to choose their opponents in such a way that the interaction structure emerges 
endogenously. The evolution of cooperation in finitely and infinitely repeated prisoner dilemma 
games has also been studied by Bicchieri (1990), Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Nachbar 
(1992), among others. The main difference with the present paper is that I focus on the 
dynamics of cooperative behavior when each game is played as a one shot game. 
 
Evolution of cooperation in one shot games has been studied by Bergstrom (1995), Bergstrom 
and Stark (1993) and Frank (1987), among others. What makes cooperation a feasible outcome 
in Frank's model is that before they play the game agents observe a noisy signal which informs 
them about the type of behavior to be expected from the opponent. This signal is supposed to be 
encoded in someone's genes. Players can make their one shot strategy conditional upon the 
observed signal. Bergstrom (1995) and Bergstrom and Stark (1993) also regard genes as the 
determinants of behavior and the object of selection. In their models, children inherit their 
genetical make-up from their parents. Cooperation emerges in their papers, because the 
prisoner's dilemma game is (mainly) played between siblings and as siblings have similar genes 
cooperative genes may do better than defective ones. The local interaction aspect of our model 
is the counterpart of the interaction between siblings in the papers by Bergstrom and Stark. Our 
paper is, however, closer in spirit to the main body of papers in evolutionary game theory in 
  
 
 4 
economics in the sense that the fundamental object on which the evolutionary or imitation 
process works is a strategy and not genes. 
 
The paper closest to ours is Eshel et al. (1998). They show that under IBB with strict local 
interaction within a small neighborhood the majority of agents in a population will display 
cooperative behavior. There are a few differences between their paper and the present one. The 
present paper is simpler as at any point in time, there is one group of cooperators and one group 
of defectors. This is convenient as the dynamic process can be investigated by looking at the 
boundary between regions. Drawback of this assumption is that we can not allow for the 
possibility of mutants entering the population. On the other hand, the present paper is more 
general as different types of imitative behavior are considered and as a combination of local and 
uniform interaction is studied. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model that is used. Section 3 
presents the results under imitating the best behavior dynamics and Section 4 briefly discusses 
the imitating the best agent dynamics. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix. 
 
 
2. The Models 
 
I consider a dynamic model where time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... and the population is located 
on a circle. In each period, each member of the population plays the following Prisoner's 
Dilemma game with other people in the population, with b > a > d > c. 
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Pay-offs: Strategy of player 2 
 C D 
strategy 
of  
player 1 
C (a,a) (c,b) 
 D (b,c) (d,d) 
 
Table 1. Pay-offs in the Prisoner's Dilemma game 
 
At t = 0, the population is divided into two groups, one group of cooperators and one group of 
defectors. The pay-off of individual i is composed of two parts. The local interaction part 
measures the pay-off out of interaction with the K immediate neighbors on either side. In most 
cases I will restrict the analysis for computational convenience to neighborhoods of two agents, 
one on each side. The uniform interaction part measures the pay-off out of interaction with 
anyone in the population. The average pay-off to individual i can be written as 
 
      
) 1-N (
)j  i, (u  
 ) - (1 +
2
k)+i i, (u  + ) k-i i, (u 
  = U
ij
K
k
i 
∑∑ ≠= αα 1  (1) 
 
where Ui is the average pay-off of the individual agent on location i, α is the relative weight of 
local interaction in the average pay-off of individual i, ui(i,j) is the pay-off of individual i when 
interacting with individual j and N is the size of the population. 
 
Equation (1) allows for two interpretations. First, one may consider a situation in which each 
individual meets only one other agent in the population in a certain period. The parameter α can 
then be interpreted as the probability that the individual will meet someone out of his 
neighborhood (and within this neighborhood, he will meet someone at random). In this 
interpretation, Ui is the expected pay-off of individual i and I have to allow agents to observe the 
expected pay-off of other agents (in the neighborhood) to retain a determinstic dynamics. A 
second and more favored interpretation is one in which agents meet everyone in the population, 
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but meet neighbors more frequently than others. In this interpretation α measures the relative 
importance of local interaction for the average pay-off of an individual. Note that α is assumed 
to be independent of the population size.2 
 
With neighborhoods of two agents, one can distinguish three subcategories of the cooperative, 
respectively defective, behavior depending on the neighbors. I will denote by D+ and C+ the 
individuals who defect, respectively, cooperate and who are surrounded by cooperative agents; 
D0 and C0 represent the individuals who have one cooperating neighbor and one defecting 
neighbor and D— and C— stand for the individuals who are surrounded by defecting individuals. 
When there is just one group of cooperators and one of defectors, the following statements hold. 
The '0' category of each type is the individual at the boundary between a cooperative region and 
a defective region. In any period in time there are maximally two individuals of each of these 
two '0' categories. The categories D+ and C— only come into play if there is one defective, 
respectively one cooperative, type left over in the population and these categories will de 
discussed only when appropriate. 
 
What is important for the dynamics of the system is how the four different categories that 
remain (D0, D—, C+ and C—) are ranked in terms of average pay-off. Straightforward 
calculations show that the pay-offs of the four categories under consideration are as follows: 
                     
     2 If, on the other hand, the size of the neighborhood and the number of interactions with each agent in the 
neighborhood is fixed, then the importance of local interaction decreases with  N. I think my way of comparing 
populations with different sizes, keeping α constant, is more natural. 
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 category frequency payoff (2) 
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where the number of cooperative (defective) agents is denoted by x (N-x). A few observations 
with respect to these pay-offs can be made. Obviously, the average pay-off of the '+' categories 
of each type is larger than the average pay-off of the '0' category and this in turn is larger than 
the average pay-off of the '-' category. Also, the average pay-off of the D0 individuals is larger 
than that of the C0 individuals. This is because the pay-off out of local interaction is the same for 
both categories, but the pay-off out of uniform interaction is larger for the D0 individuals. 
 
Under imitation dynamics, it is important to specify the information agents have about the pay-
offs of other individuals. In this paper, I assume that agents observe the pay-offs of agents in 
their neighborhood, but not the pay-offs of agents outside the neighborhood. The basic idea here 
is that one needs a sufficient number of interactions with another agent to figure out what her 
pay-off actually is. By imitation I mean that an individual chooses the same action (cooperate or 
defect) that the type (or individual) has chosen who is imitated. If the neighborhood consists of 
individuals who take the same action, then this action is by definition the best in the 
neighborhood. Within this framework I analyze the dynamics stemming from "imitating the best 
agent in your neighborhood" (IBA) as well as from "imitating the behavior (cooperative or 
defective) with the highest average pay-off in your neighborhood" (IBB). According to the first 
dynamics, agents observe the pay-off of each individual in their neighborhood and choose, in 
the next period, the action the agents with the highest pay-off has chosen in this period. 
According to the second dynamics, agents only observe the average pay-off of cooperative and 
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defective behaviors in their neighborhood and choose, in the next period, the behavior that has 
yielded the highest pay-off in this period.  
 
 
3. Imitating the Best Behavior 
 
In this section I consider a dynamic process based on "imitating the best behavior in your 
neighborhood" (IBB), where the best behavior is defined as the behavior (cooperative or 
defective) with the highest average pay-off. In what follows, I shall focus on the behavior of the 
boundary between the regions of cooperators and defectors. Note that the neighborhoods of the 
two individuals at the boundary differ: the neighborhood of the cooperative individual at one 
side of the boundary consists of one C+ agent and one D0 agent and that the neighborhood of the 
defector at the other side of the boundary consist of one C0 agent and one D— agent. 
Accordingly, I have to calculate the average pay-offs in the two neighborhoods separately.  
 
To understand the main idea behind the Propositions below, I first concentrate on the special 
cases in which (a-c) = (b-d). The expressions for the average pay-off of the cooperator, resp. 
defector in the neighborhood of the defective agent (D0) easily follow from the previous section: 
 
 
     
4
d)-(b + d + 
1-N
)-d)(1-x(b = (D)U
2
c)-(a - 
1-N
x)-c)(1-x)(a-(N - a = (C)U
D
D
0
0
αα
α
  
 
where , (C)U D0  resp. ,(D)U D0  is the average pay-off of cooperators, respectively, defectors in 
the neighborhood of the D0 individual. From these expressions it follows that in the special case 
under consideration 0 0D DU (C) >  U (D)  if 
 
 c)/4.-(a3 - d)-(a > c)-(d - 
4
c)-(a N αα 

  (3) 
 
Similarly, the average pay-off of the cooperators, resp. defectors in the neighborhood of the 
cooperative individual C0 is given by 
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0
0
C
C
U (C) =  a -  
(N - x)(a - c)(1 - )
N - 1
 -  (a - c)
4
U (D) =  
x(b - d)(1 - )
N - 1
 +  d +  (b - d)
2
     
α α
α α
  
 
where  (C)U C0 ,  resp. ,(D)U C0  is the average pay-off of cooperators, resp. defectors in the 
neighborhood of the C0 individual. It is easily seen that in the special case of (a-c) = (b-d) the 
following is true:  (D)U > (C)U DD 00 if, and only if, (D).U > (C)U CC 00  Hence, when condition 
(3) is satisfied, the D0 individuals will switch to cooperation and, as the above argument is 
independent of time and the number of cooperators in the population, cooperation will be the 
most observed behavior in the long run. In the context of proposition 2 and 3 it is shown in the 
appendix that the population will either have two defectors or will cycle between one and three 
defectors in the long run. On the other hand, when condition (3) is violated it is clear that 
 (D)U < (C)U DD 00  and (D)U < (C)U CC 00  so that defection will prevail in the long run. 
Condition (3) also reveals that for cooperation to emerge in the long run N has to be larger than 
a certain cut-off value, which depends on the pay-off parameters and the value of α. This result 
is formally stated in proposition 1 and graphically illustrated in figure 1. 
Proposition 1. Suppose (a-c) = (b-d) and x0 = 2. There is a time period T such that for all t >, T, 
(i) if ( ) ( ) ,4/)(3)
4
cad-(a > cdcaN −−


−−
−
α
α then xt ≥ N-3. 
(ii) if ( ) ( ) ,4/)(3)
4
cad-(a  cdcaN −−<


−−
−
α
α then xt =0. 
  
α
4(d-c)
a-c
1 Nfigure 1
defection
cooperation
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The condition (a-c) = (b-d) has two important implications. First, it implies that the ranking of 
pay-offs of cooperators and defectors at the boundary does not depend on the number of 
cooperators in the population and, hence, that this ranking does not change endogenously over 
time. Second, it implies that if cooperation is better on average than defection in the 
neighborhood of the defector at the boundary than it is also better in the neighborhood of the 
cooperator at the boundary, and vice versa. The two Propositions below show how the result 
indicated above generalizes to other values of the pay-off parameters. It turns out that for a 
given value of α the result generalizes for large and for small values of N. However, for 
intermediate values of N new phenomena emerge: if (a-c) > (b-d), then the initial number of 
cooperators becomes important in co-determining the long-run outcome of the population 
(dependence on initial conditions). If, however, (a-c) < (b-d), then the population will converge 
to a stable configuration with a group of cooperators and a group of defectors coexisting next to 
each other. 
 
To be able to formally state the results for intermediate values of N, I need to introduce three 
additional parameters, namely x1*, x2* and x1~. These variables are defined as follows: 
 
( )[ ]d)-(b-c)-(ax-c)-N(a)-(1 + 4
d)-(b+c)-2(a1)-(N = 1)-d)(N-(a *1αα    (4) 
( )[ ](a - d)(N - 1) =  (N - 1) 2(b - d)+ (a - c)4  +  (1 - ) N(b - d) - x (a - c) - (b - d)2*α α    (5) 
[ ] ( )[ ]c)-(a-d)-(bx-c)-N(a)-(1 + c)-(a+d)-2(b1)-(N4 = 1)-d)(N-(a 1~α
α    (6) 
 
The parameter *1x , resp. ,*2x  may be interpreted for the case )()( dbca −<−  as the number of 
cooperators in the population such that the defector respectively cooperator, at the boundary is 
indifferent between defecting and cooperating. (Note that the number need not be a natural 
number). A similar interpretation holds true for ~1x  in case )()( dbca −<− . 
 
I am now ready to state the two main propositions. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose (a-c) > (b-d) and x0 > 2. There is a time period T such that 
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(i) if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N a c b d d c  >  (a - d a c b dα α2 4 4 2
− − −
− −




− − + −)   
 then xt ≥ N-3 for all t > T, 
(ii) if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N b d a c b a  >  (a - d b d a cα α2 4 4 2
− − −
− −




− − + −)   
 then xt = 0 for all t > T, 
 
(iii) if the conditions under (i) and (ii) are not satisfied, 
 then xt ≥ N-3 for all t > T if x0 > x1* 
  xt = 0 for all t > T if x0 < x2* 
  xt = x0 for all t if x1* < x0 < x2*. 
 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose (a-c) < (b-d) and x0 > 2. There is a time period T such that  
(i) if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N 2(b - d) - (a - c)4  -  b a  >  a d b d a cα
α
−



 − − − + −4 2 .   
 then xt > N-3 for all t > T; 
(ii) if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N 2(a - c) - (b - d)4  -  d c  >  a d a c b dα
α
−



 − − − + −4 2  
 then xt = 0 for all t > T;  
(iii) if the conditions under (i) and (ii) are not satisfied, 
 then xt = 0  for all t > T if x1~ < 5 
  xt cycles around x1~ with period 4  for all t > T  if x1~ > 6. 
 
Two elements of the stated propositions deserve some further explanation. First, the initial 
number of cooperators, x0 has to be larger than or equal to 2 in order for cooperation to have any 
chance of surviving. Second, the first part of both Propositions should be read as follows: 
depending on the initial number of defectors (whether it is odd or even) either the population 
converges to everyone cooperating in the long run or the population converges to a two-period 
cycle in which the number of defective agents alternates between 1 and 3. 
 
 
4. Imitating the best Agent 
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I have argued in Section 3 that when local interaction is confined to meeting one individual on 
either side, then at the boundary the individual who defects receives a higher pay-off than the 
one (at the other side of the boundary) who cooperates. This implies that under IBA with local 
interaction in a neighborhood of two, the defective agent will keep on playing defect. On the 
other hand, the cooperative agent at the boundary may (if the D0 agent receives a higher pay-off 
than the C+ agent) or may not (if the D0 agent receives a smaller pay-off than the C+ agent) 
switch to defect. Hence, cooperation is not a feasible long-run outcome in the population at 
large; only coexistence or defection are to show that this particular result is sensitive to the 
neighborhood structure and that the general result also holds true under IBA I will now consider 
local interaction in a neighborhood of four (two on each side). As the main ideas of the analysis 
are quite similar to the analysis under IBB, I will only consider the case (a-c) > (b-d) and 
concentrate on the condition on the parameters that makes cooperation the predominant long-
run behavior in the population. 
 
In the figure below the boundary between a region of cooperators and a defectors is depicted 
and individuals 1 and 2 have chosen to cooperate in the past and agents 3 and 4 have chosen to 
defect. I will investigate the long-run behavior of the population by looking at the behavior of 
the boundary in the next period. 
 
 
C C C D D D 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
The pay-offs of the four individuals is respectively: 
 1U  =  
3a + c
4
 +  (1 - ) (x - 1)a + (N - x)c
N - 1
α α  (7) 
 2U  =  
2a + 2c
4
 +  (1 - ) (x - 1)a + (N - x)c
N - 1
α α   
 
1-N
1)d-x-(N+b)(x)-(1 + 
4
2d+2b = U 3 αα   
 
1-N
1)d-x-(N+b)(x)-(1 + 
4
3d+b = U 4 αα   
 
Comparing the pay-offs of individuals 1 and 3 reveals that 1 3U  >  U , if and only if, 
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[ ] [ ]α α4 (a - d)+ (c - d)+ 2(a - b)  (N - 1) >  (1 - ) (d - c)N + (a - d)+ x(b - d - (a - c)) .   
 
This inequality holds for all x if it holds for x = 0. Rewriting yields  
[ ]N 3(a - c) - 2(b - d)
4
 -  (d - c)  >  (a - d) -  
4
2(a - c)+ 3(b - d) .α α

  (8) 
 
As agent 1 is in 3's neighborhood, agent 3 observes 1's pay-off. Also, 3 observes the pay-off of 
agents 4 and 5, but these pay-offs are lower than his. Hence, individual 3 will switch to 
cooperation in the next period. Hence, if the above inequality holds, the boundary between the 
regions of cooperators and the defectors will be between individuals 3 and 4. As the above 
argument is independent of time, it can be used to prove that in the long run the population 
consists predominantly of cooperators.3 
 
                     
     3 Note that depending on the number of cooperators in the first period in relation to the size of the population, the 
population may converge to all agents cooperating or to a two-period cycle in which N-1 (or N-2) cooperate in 
period t and N-5 (or N-6) cooperate in period t+1. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have investigated conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a 
population in which individuals are matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Part of the 
interactions between individuals are local and part of them are global. It is shown that for a large 
class of parameter values and for different kinds of dynamic processes, cooperation will emerge 
if, and only if, the population size is large enough. 
 
The main principle on which the result is based is that only relative performance matters in 
evolution and relative performance of defectors becomes poorer when the population size 
increases (due to a smaller difference in pay-offs out of uniform interaction). It has been shown 
that this principle holds for different types of imitative behavior. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) Suppose (a - c) >  (b - d)  In this case the following is true: if 
(D).U>(C)U(D)U>(C)U CCDD 0000  also then ,  Moreover, it is easily seen that if 
0 0D DU (C) >  U (D)  for x = 0, then it holds for all values of x. Finally, 
0 0D DU (C) >  U (D)  for x = 0 if 
 [ ].d)-(b+c)-2(a
4
 - d)-(a > cddbca N αα 


−−
−−− )(
4
)()(2  
 
 Hence, if this condition holds, the D0 agent at the boundary will switch to cooperation, 
while the C0 agent will stick to cooperation. Hence, the boundary between the regions 
shifts and more agent cooperate. This process continues until either there is no defector 
left or there is only one D+ agent left in the population. This agent will be imitated by its 
neighbors, but they will switch back to cooperation the next period. Hence, for some T, 
we have that for all t > T, xt ≥ N - 3. 
 
(ii) When (a - c) >  (b - d) , we have that (C).U > (D)U  (C)U > (D)U DDCC 0000 implies   
 Moreover, it is easily seen that if 0 0C CU (D) >  U (C)  for x = N, it also holds for any 
x < N. Finally, 0 0C CU (D) >  U (C)  for x = N if 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N b d a c b a  >  (a - d b d a cα α2 4 4 2
− − −
− −




− − + −)  
 
 Hence, when this condition holds, the C0 agent at the boundary will switch to defection 
and the D0 agent will continue to defect. This process of C0 agents switching to 
defection continues until all agents defect. (The last cooperative agent may belong to the 
C— category and he will switch to defection as well.) 
 
(iii) Suppose that the conditions under (i) and (ii) are both not satisfied. For any given x, N 
and pay-off parameters, there are x1* and x2*, defined by equations (4) and (5). From 
these equations it is clear that x1* > x2*. We also know that x1* > 0 and x2* < N. I will 
argue that if x0 > x1*, the analysis under (i) remains valid, if x0 < x2* the analysis under 
(ii) remains valid and if x2* < x0 < x1* there will be coexistence and the boundary remains 
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where it is. Suppose x0 > x1*. It is easily seen that in period 0, 0 0D DU (C) >  U (D).  
Following the argument under (i) reveals that in period 1 x has increased by 2. However, 
when (a - c) >  (b - d) . more x favors cooperation, i.e., 0 0D DU (C) >  U (D)  in period 
1,2,... Hence, the analysis under (i) holds true. Similarly, if x0 < x2*, 0 0C CU (D) >  U (C)  
in period 0 and the decrease in x favors defection in subsequent periods. Finally, 
consider x2* < x0 < x1*. In this case in period 0, 0 0D DU (C) <  U (D)  and 
0 0C CU (C) >  U (D).  Hence, nobody will switch to another behavior in period 1 or in 
any subsequent period. This implies coexistence of the two regions. 
 Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) If (a - c) <  (b - d) , then (D).U > (C)U  (D)U > (C)U DDCC 0000 implies  Also, 
0 0C CU (C) >  U (D)  holds for all x if it holds for x = N. The inequality holds for x = N if 
[ ](a - d)(N - 1) >  4 (N - 1) 2(b - d)+ (a - c)  +  N(1 - )(b - d),
α
α   
 which can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N 2(b - d) - (a - c)4  -  b a  >  a d b d a cα
α
−



 − − − + −4 2 .  
 
 For the rest of the argument, I refer to the proof of Proposition 1 (i). 
 
(ii) In the same way as above: 0 0D DU (D) >  U (C)  holds for all x if it holds for x = 0. 
Moreover, (C)U > (D)U  (C)U > (D)U CCDD 0000 implies  and 0 0D DU (D) >  U (C)  holds 
for x = 0 if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]N 2(a - c) - (b - d)4  -  d c  >  a d a c b dα
α
−



 − − − + −4 2 . 
 
 For the rest of the argument, I refer to the proof of Proposition 1 (ii). 
 
(iii) Suppose that the conditions under (i) and (ii) are not satisfied. For any given α and N, 
there are x1~ and x2~ defined by the following equalities: 
 [ ] ( )[ ](a - d)(N - 1) =  4 (N - 1) 2(b - d)+ (a - c)  +  (1 - ) N(a - c) - x (b - d) - (a - c)1~
α
α   
 and 
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 [ ](a - d)(N - 1) =  4 (N - 1) 2(a - c)+ (b - d)  +  N(1 - )(a - c)
α
α )-(1x + ~2 α  
[ ]c)-(a-d)-(b . 
 From the above equations it is clear that x1~ < x2~. Also, I know that x1~ < N and x2~ > 0, 
but it may be that x1~ < 0 and x2~ > N. 
 
 Consider first an arbitrary xt > x2~. As in this case 0 0C CU (D) >  U (C)  and 
0 0D DU (D) >  U (D) , xt+1 = xt - 2. On the other hand, for an arbitrary xt ∈ [3, x
1~), 
0 0C CU (C) >  U (D)  and 0 0D DU (C) >  U (D)  so that xt+1 = xt + 2. 
 
 Let us then consider an xt ∈ [x1~, x2~] and suppose there is one region with cooperative 
behavior. It is clear that both the D0 and the C0 agent will switch actions in period t+1 so 
that xt+1 = xt. At each of the two boundaries on the circle between cooperators and 
defectors the sequence of categories at t+1 is as follows: 
C+ -C0- D+-C—- D0- D—, 
 where the D+ (C—) agent is the C0 (D0) agent of period t. It is clear that at t+2, both the 
C0 and C— agent of t+1 will switch to defection. Hence, taken the two boundaries 
together xt+2 = xt - 4. 
 
 Suppose then that x1~ > 6. Consider xt > x1~. From the above, it is clear that xt+2 = xt - 4. 
If xt+2 > x1~, then xt+4 = xt+2 - 4. If, on the other hand xt+2 < x1~, then xt+3 = xt+2 + 2. If 
xt+3 < x1~, then xt+4 = xt+2 + 4 and I have a cycle of period 4 around x1~. If xt+3 > x1~, then 
xt+5 = xt+3 - 4. As x1~ > 6, and as xt is an integer xt+5 is either 3 or 4. This implies that 
xt+6 = xt+5 + 2 and xt+7 = xt+6 + 2 = xt+3, establishing (again) a cycle of period 4. A similar 
analysis applies if 3 ≤ xt ≤ x1~. 
 
 Suppose then that x1~ < 5. If xt > x1~, then xt+2 = xt - 4. If xt+2 is equal to 1 or 2, then x-
t+3 = 0. If on the other hand, xt+2 equals 3 or 4, then xt+3 = xt+2 + 2 and xt+3 > x1~. In this 
case, however, xt+5 = xt+3 - 4 and xt+5 is equal to 1 or 2. 
 Q.E.D. 
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